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CONTROLLING ISSUE OF UTAH LAW CERTIFIED TO THIS COURT
Can a Keogh plan be "described in" section § 401(a) pf the IRC despite failing to
fulfill that section's requirements for qualification, thereby entitling debtor to exempt the
plan from his bankruptcy estate property?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Former Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x) (2000) provides as follows:
78-23-5. Property exempt from execution.
(l)(a) An individual is entitled to exemption o|f the following
property:

(x) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), any
money or other assets held for or payable to the individual as
a participant or beneficiary from or an interest! of the
individual as a participant or beneficiary in a Retirement plan
or arrangement that is described in Section 40jl(a), 401(h),
401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 408A, 409, 414(d), or 414(e) of
the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1^86, as
amended;

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Douglas James Reinhart (the "Debtor") filed a voluntary chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition on January 28, 2000 (the "Petition Date"). (Aplt. App. DLG00016,1 4a.)1
In his amended schedules, the Debtor claimed an exemption for $333,835.65 contained
in his alleged Keogh plan under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5 (l)(a)(x) (2000).3 Under this
statute, funds contained in Keogh plans that are "described in" § 401(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code are exempt from the claims of creditors and trustees in bankruptcy.4
Chapter 7 Trustee, David Gladwell (the 'Trustee"), timely objected to the claimed
exemption. (Aplt. App. DLG00012-00014.) He asserted, among other things, that
because of operational defaults, the alleged Keogh plan was not a "qualified plan" under

1

Citations to the record in the Tenth Circuit are to Appellant's Appendix filed in
the Tenth Circuit, which is also on file in this Court.
2

In his amended schedules filed on May 16, 2000, the Debtor initially claimed
that $306,000 was in the alleged Keogh plan on the Petition Date. He amended his
schedules again in September 2006, increasing that amount to $333,835.65. (Aplt. App.
DLG00016-00017, % 4 b and d.)
3

This statute is now found in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-505 (l)(a)(xiv) (2008).
When determining the validity of a claimed state law exemption, bankruptcy law looks to
applicable state law. In re Hodes, 402 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir. 2005), (citing In re
Lampe, 331 F.3d 750, 754 (10th Cir. 2003)).
4

Utah's legislature has opted out of the federal exemptions provided under the
Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the exemptions available under state law are the
exemptions available under the Bankruptcy Code for debtors residing in Utah. See 11
U.S.C. § 522 (b); former Utah Code Ann § 78-23-15 (2000); current Utah Code Ann §
78B-5-513(2008).
2

§ 401(a) on the Petition Date,5 and, therefore, the funds therein were not contained in a
plan "described in" §401(a).
On the facts presented at trial (most of which were undisputed), the bankruptcy
court entered oral findings and conclusions (Aplt. App. DLGP0034-00059, Add. B
hereto) determining that the alleged Keogh plan was "operationally in default" on the
Petition Date. (Add. B hereto, p. 428/13-14.) Despite this determination and the
bankruptcy court's conclusion that the plan was "arguably n0t tax qualified," the court
determined that the plan was "nonetheless, described in Section 401(a)," and that
therefore the funds in the plan were exempt under the Utah Statute. (Add. B hereto, p.
428/7-12.)6 On June 8, 2008, the Bankruptcy Court entered lits written order to that
effect. (Add. A hereto.)
The district court entered its order affirming the bankruptcy court order on
February 6, 2009. (Add. C hereto.) The district court incorporated by reference the
bankruptcy court's oral findings and conclusions regarding the exempt status of the funds
in the plan. Id. The Trustee timely appealed the district cou^t decision to the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals. (Aplt. App. DLG00375-00377.)

Exemptions are determined based upon the status of the property on the petition
date. See e.g. In re Rowe, 236 B.R. 11, 14 (9th Cir. B.A.P. (999); In re Lawrence, 235
B.R. 498, 509 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999), vacated on other grounds, 244 B.R. 868 (S.D. Fla.
2004) (notwithstanding Internal Revenue Code provisions allowing for retroactive cure of
plan disqualification, a pension plan that is not qualified or* the petition date is not
entitled to state law exemption for qualified plans).
6

The bankruptcy court's oral findings and conclusions are discussed further in the
Statement of Facts, below.
3

The Trustee's appeal to the Tenth Circuit was fully briefed7 and argued. On
December 22, 2009, the Tenth Circuit issued its Order Certifying State Law Question
(the "First Certification Order," Add. D hereto).
On January 5, 2010, the Debtor filed a Petition for Panel Rehearing (on file in this
Court). The Debtor made two arguments. First, the Debtor (accurately) pointed out that
in the First Certification Order the Tenth Circuit had slightly misquoted former § 78-23-5
(l)(a)(x) by using term "described by" rather than "described in." Second, the Debtor
argued that the First Certification Order should not have determined that the Debtor's
Keogh Plan was not "qualified under" § 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code on the
Q

Petition Date, because the bankruptcy court had made no such finding.
The Tenth Circuit accepted the Debtor's first argument, but rejected his second
argument. See Order entered January 25, 2010, treating the Debtor's petition for
rehearing as a motion to reconsider and granting it in part and denying it in part. (Add. E
hereto.) Thus, on January 25, 2010, the Tenth Circuit entered a second Order Certifying
State Law Question (the "Second Certification Order," Add. F hereto) changing only the
Utah statutory reference from "described by" to "described in." On March 8, 2010, this
Court entered its Order of Acceptance, accepting the certified question in the Second
Certification Order.
The Trustee's opening and reply briefs in the Tenth Circuit, and the Debtor's
brief in the Tenth Circuit, are on file in this Court.
8

The Debtor also proposed the following statement of the issue to be certified to
this Court: "Can a Keogh plan be "described in" section 401(a) of the IRC despite being
operationally in default on the bankruptcy petition date, thereby entitling the debtor to
exempt the plan from his bankruptcy estate property?"
4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
From 1992 to the Petition Date, the Debtor worked a^ an anesthesiologist in
Ogden, Utah. Initially, he operated as a sole proprietor and, in 1996, he incorporated his
practice as Douglas Reinhart, M.D., P.C. (the "PC"). The D|ebtor was the sole
shareholder and the president of the PC. (Aplt. App. DLGOOO 16-00017, ^ 4 a, e, f, g, h.)
In December 1992, the Debtor (as a sole proprietor) established his alleged Keogh
plan by adopting a prototype Keogh plan offered through Charles Schwab & Co.
("Schwab"), which included a money purchase pension plan component and a profit
sharing plan component for himself and his employees. The Debtor was the Keogh plan
administrator, and he made contributions for his benefit every year after adoption. No
employees other than the Debtor were ever made participants or received contributions
under the Keogh plan. (Aplt. App. DLGOOO 17-00019, ^ 4 a, i, j , o, p, q, s, u, v, w, x, y, z.
aa; Add. B hereto, p. 419/17-23.)
One of the non-waivable requirements of the Keogh |plan was that all eligible
employees be made participants. (Aplt. App. DLG00208/16-19; Add. B hereto, p. 420/34.) The Debtor did not ensure that this requirement was m0t. His wife, Janet Reinhart
("Janet"), was an eligible employee from 1993 to the Petition Date, but was never
included as a participant and never received any of the mandatory or discretionary
contributions provided for under the Keogh plan. (Aplt. A#>p. DLGOOO 17-00019, H 4 k,
1, v, w, x, y, z, aa.) The Debtor admitted that Janet had specifically requested to be a
participant and that he never acted upon her request. [Aplt. App. DLG00191-00194 (Tr.
89/23-92/8); DLG00275-00280.]
5

When the Debtor incorporated the PC in January 1996, he ceased to be selfemployed and became an employee of the PC. However, rather than cause the PC to
adopt a new plan or restate the Keogh plan as its own, the Debtor caused the PC to
continue making contributions to the Keogh plan as if he remained a self-employed
individual. (Aplt. App. DLG00018, ^ 4 p, q.) The Debtor ultimately did cause the PC to
adopt and restate the Keogh plan as a corporate pension plan, but this did not occur until
August 16, 2001, more than a year-and-a-half after the Petition Date, and after the
Trustee had filed his objection. (Add. B hereto, pp. 417/14 - 418/1; Aplt. App.
DLG00141-00149.)
Although the Debtor (and his PC) made contributions to the Keogh plan every
year, the contributions were not in the manner required. (Aplt. App. DLG00100.) For
example, under the money purchase plan component, the Debtor was required to make
contributions of 10% of each participant's annual compensation. He did not do so. Id.
The Keogh plan documents provided that the money purchase contribution was
mandatory and that failure to fund would "cause the employer's Schwab Plan to be an
individually designated plan (as described in the Schwab Plan section 10.2)." [Aplt. App.
DLG00122, §§ 3.1(b) and 3.1(d).]
Additionally, the Keogh plan required contributions to be made exclusively
through Schwab as the Keogh plan "custodian." [Id. at § 3.1(d).] The Debtor
disregarded this requirement by directing investments through himself as the selfdesignated "trustee" of the Keogh plan. Specifically, in December 1999, he made a
$10,400 contribution (through himself as the alleged plan trustee) to fund a secured
6

automobile loan to Colleen Parker (the "Parker Loan"). (Aplt. App. DLG00018, ^ 4u and
DLG00101-00112.) Finally, for the year 2000, the Debtor caused contributions to be
made that were $1,455.75 in excess of the maximum contributions limits set under
§ 415(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. (Aplt. App. DLG00J00, DLG00136-00140, and
DLG00177-00178.)
At trial, the Trustee's expert on qualification of plans under § 401(a), W. Waldan
Lloyd, testified that, according to IRS practices and procedures, several of the operational
defects described above resulted in disqualification of the Keogh plan as of the Petition
Date.9 (Aplt. App. DLG00194-00259.) The bankruptcy court found Mr. Lloyd's
unrebutted testimony to be "credible." Also, the bankruptcy court was "persuaded by
[his] opinion that the Keogh plan may not be a qualified plah under IRC 401(a) because
of the operational failures stated." (Add. B hereto, pp. 424/$-11.)
Notwithstanding its findings regarding the nonqualified status of the alleged
Keogh plan under § 401(a), the bankruptcy court determined that the plan nonetheless
was "described in Section 401(a)" and, therefore, exempt. (Add. B hereto, p. 428/7-12.)
Relying heavily on In re Kaplan, 162 B.R. 684 (Bankr. E.E}. Pa. 1993) (wherein the court
opined in dictum that the term "provided for under § 401(a)," as contained in
Pennsylvania's exemption statute, was broader than "qualified under" § 401(a)), the
9

Mr. Lloyd did not testify regarding the Debtor's failure to cause the PC to adopt
the Keogh plan in 1996. However, this operational defect also results in plan
disqualification because his plan was no longer maintained! by an "employer" as required
by § 401(a). See Rev. Rul. 67-3, 1967-1 CB 94 (A sole prqprietorship was converted to a
partnership, but the partnership did not adopt the proprietorship plan nor establish a new
plan. The plan could not, therefore, be considered a plan of the partnership and
deductions for contributions to a qualified plan could not be claimed).
7

bankruptcy court here opined that the "described in" language used in Utah's exemption
statute was broad enough to encompass funds in nonqualified plans. (Add. B hereto, p.
428/7-12.)
The Debtor has repeatedly argued that his plan was "described in" § 401(a)
because he could correct plan defaults under the IRS' Employee Plans Compliance
Resolution System ("EPCRS"). However, the bankruptcy court made no findings with
respect to EPCRS. Further, it is undisputed that the Debtor has never attempted to take
advantage of EPCRS.
The Trustee's June 15, 2000 objection to the exemption gave the Debtor notice
that his plan "may not be qualified under applicable law." (Aplt. App. DLG00013.)
Also, more than a year before trial, the Debtor was advised of the specifics of his plan's
operational defaults, through Mr. Lloyd's expert reports (DLG00150-00178), the
Trustee's hearing brief (DLG00062-00077), and the Pretrial Order (DLG00015-00026).
Despite this notice and Mr. Lloyd's testimony that most, if not all, of the operational
defaults in the Debtor's plan were correctable under EPCRS (Aplt. App. DLG00228DLG00229, pp. 126/15-127/25), the Debtor did nothing prior to trial, and has done
nothing since, to attempt to correct the defaults in his plan. He has also never explained,
either at trial or on appeal, his reasons for not attempting to use EPCRS.
Regarding EPCRS, Mr. Lloyd explained that based on the nature of the defaults,
the Debtor would be unable to use Self Correction Procedures ("SCP") (where a taxpayer
simply fixes the problem and no notice to the IRS is required). Instead, the Debtor would
be required to use the more formal Voluntary Correction Procedures ("VCP") (where a
8

taxpayer must admit the default to the IRS, pay a fee, and obtain approval of remedial
measures to be taken). (Aplt. App. DLG00231-00233, pp. 129/20-131/10). See also
Rev. Proc. 2006-27 § 10,1.R.B. 2006-22.
In addition, Mr. Lloyd testified that with respect to the Debtor's failure to include
his wife, Janet, in the plan and to make contributions on her behalf, the Debtor would
have had to pay into the plan amounts sufficient to (1) make up for the missing
contributions and (2) account for any missing earnings on tfyose contributions. Mr. Lloyd
estimated that the total of those amounts could be $30,000. (Aplt. App. DLG0024800251.) With respect to all of the plan's operational default^, in order to use the VCP the
Debtor would have had to admit that his plan was in violation of §401(a) on the Petition
Date. (Aplt. App. DLG00230/6-14, 00202/8-13.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENfT
The district court and bankruptcy court erroneously interpreted the Utah
exemption statute. Under the plain language of that statute,| its legislative history (and the
plain language of 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)), the only Keogh plan$ "described in Section
401(a)" are qualified plans. Contrary to the bankruptcy court's interpretation of In re
Kaplan, supra, that case ultimately held that the similar Pennsylvania statute (which
exempts plans "provided for under" Section 401(a)) only exempts plans that are
"qualified under" Section 401(a).
The bankruptcy court and district court apparently fetlt that the Debtor's violations
in operating the plan were not serious ones so it did not matter whether the plan was

9

qualified. However, these violations were serious enough to disqualify the plan as of the
Petition Date, as the Tenth Circuit determined, which is all that matters.
Either the Debtor's plan was qualified on the Petition Date or it was not. Because
it was not qualified, it is not a plan described in § 401(a). Any other approach does not
work, especially where there are no meaningful standards to be applied in determining
what operational defaults might be tolerated under the Utah statute.
Thus, this Court should determine that the Debtor's nonqualified Keogh plan is
not a plan "described in" § 401(a), within the meaning of the Utah exemption statute.
ARGUMENT
I.

A KEOGH PLAN THAT DOES NOT MEET THE
QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 401(a)
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE IS NOT A PLAN
"DESCRIBED IN" SECTION 401(a)

The issue of Utah law certified to this Court requires no analysis concerning the
Debtor's plan, why it is not qualified, or whether it could be fixed. The issue the Tenth
Circuit certified, notwithstanding the Debtor's motion to reconsider, is simply whether
the Utah legislature intended to exempt nonqualified Keogh plans. Based on the plain
language of the Utah statute, its legislative history, as well as the ultimate interpretation
of the similar Pennsylvania exemption statute in In re Kaplan, supra, the answer is no.

10

A.

Statutory Language

To interpret a statute, a court looks first to its plain language. In re Kunz, 2004 UT
71,1| 8, 99 P.3d 793 (quoting Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 1|84 (Utah 1998)).10 If the
court finds a provision ambiguous, it then seeks guidance fr0m the legislative history and
relevant policy considerations. Id. (quoting/ft re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah
1996)).
In general, courts are to construe exemption statutes l|iberally in favor of debtors.
Id (quoting Russell M. Miller Co. v. Givan, 325 P.2d 908, 9D9-10 (Utah 1958)).
However, "'liberal construction' is not a license . . . for the 0ourt to enlarge an exemption
or read into it provisions that are not found there." In re Hodes, 308 B.R. 61, 65-66 (10
Cir. BAP 2004) affd, 402 F.3d 1005 (10th Cir. 2005); see also PIE. Employees Federal
Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1151 (Utah 1988) (liberal construction of
homestead exemption statutes "should not be used to protect debtors from the
performance of'just obligations' . . . [Hjomestead exemption statutes 'must be construed
and interpreted to give effect to the purposes and objects . .,. the Legislature had in mind
in the enactments."5) (citations omitted)
Former Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5 (2000) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
78-23-5. Property exempt from execution.
(l)(a) An individual is entitled to exemption §f the following
property:

When interpreting state law, a federal court's "dutly is to determine . . . what the
state law is and to apply it" and to refrain from "substituting] [its] own policy choices for
those of the state legislature." In re Rubarts, 896 F.2d 107, 115 (5th Cir. 1990).
11

(x) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), any
money or other assets held for or payable to the individual as
a participant or beneficiary from or an interest of the
individual as a participant or beneficiary in a retirement plan
or arrangement that is described in Section 401(a), 401(h),
401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 408A, 409, 414(d), or 414(e) of
the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended;

The bankruptcy court used a "plain reading" analysis of former § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x)
to determine that, by use of the phrase "described in" instead of "qualified under," "the
Utah exemption statute does not require that for a plan to be exempt, it must be qualified
under 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code." (Add. B hereto, pp. 427/25-428/2). The
error in that analysis is that under the plain language of the Utah exemption statute, a plan
described in § 401(a) must necessarily be a plan that meets all the requirements to be a
qualified plan under § 401(a).
Section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code is entitled "Qualified pension, profitsharing, and stock bonus plans." 26 U.S.C. § 401 (emphasis added). Subsection (a) of
§401 is entitled "Requirements for qualification," and contains multiple subsections
delineating the qualification requirements for pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus
plans. Id
It follows that, for a plan to be described in § 401(a), it must be a plan that is a
qualified plan under § 401(a). To interpret the statute to include plans not operated

12

within the requirement of § 401(a), and therefore not qualified under § 401(a), makes the
reference to § 401(a) meaningless.
B.

Legislative History

During closing argument in the bankruptcy court, the Debtor suggested that the
Utah legislature included the "described in" language in a specific effort to broaden the
scope of the exemption beyond qualified plans. (Aplt. App. DLG00267-00270, pp.
375/17-378/17.) The bankruptcy court did not appear to rely on this alleged legislative
history in its "plain reading" analysis. Nevertheless, the actual legislative history is
instructive.
The Utah legislature enacted § 78-23-5 in 1981, and ^mended it in 1989, 1997,
and 1999. " The 1989 amendment introduced retirement plans to the list of exempt
property and added the "described in" language. The Trusted could not locate any
legislative history explaining the legislature's choice of the words "described in" as
opposed to "qualified under." However, participants in the Senate and House floor
11

See Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996)
(citations omitted):
The court's primary responsibility in construing legislative enactments is to
give effect to the Legislature's underlying intent. Generally, the best
indication of that intent is the statute's plain language. Thus, the court will
interpret a statute according to its plain language, unless such a reading is
unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express
purpose of the statute. In addition, statutory enactments are to be so
construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and
interpretations are to be avoided which render some £art of a provision
nonsensical or absurd.
12

The 1997 amendment inserted § 408 in the list of Internal Revenue Code
sections, and made other relatively minor changes to the statute. The 1999 amendment
inserted 408A in the string of sections. (Aplt. App. DLG00179-00180.)
13

debates, while not directly addressing the issue of "described in" versus "qualified
under," repeatedly used the word "qualified" when referring to plans falling within the
scope of the amendment.
For example, Senate sponsor Fred Finlinson stated the following:
[A]t this point our exempt list does not identify the things that
the federal income tax laws have said are exempt from
creditors. Senate Bill 12 brings into our bankruptcy law a
consistency with the federal taxation law. So what it would do
is say to an individual participant in a qualified plan, that in
the event that he took out bankruptcy, that the benefits of his
qualified pension plan would not be available for creditors.
That would preserve the integrity of the qualified pension
plan, and it would make our bankruptcy treatment consistent
with the federal law.
48th Gen. Sess. (Jan. 17, 1989) (statement of Sen. Finlinson) (starts at 24 min. 36 sec.)
(emphasis added). (An audio recording of the legislative history is contained in Aplt.
App.DLG00281.)
In addition, Representative Lunt stated the following in his presentation of the bill
to the House:
Under the current situation there is a conflict that exists
between the federal bankruptcy law and the federal law
governing pensions known as ERISA. Now, the ERISA
pension provisions provide that benefits are protected from
creditors. These benefits would be under the qualified plans
of certain annuities, the qualified plans that come under the
Internal Revenue Code of Section 401(a). They may not be
attached or levied on or sold by creditors. However, in the
State of Utah, the bankruptcy courts have ruled that because
the Utah law does not exempt these pensions, that a pension
can be sold by a trustee in bankruptcy. This raises serious
problems for pensions and for pension plan trustees. By
amending the Utah Exemptions Act to include the retirement
benefits as exempt property, the current conflict between the
federal laws can be eliminated . . . . These laws have been
14

enacted in other states. I think they are supported universally
by pension administrators and those folks who ^re involved in
the administration and participation in these qualified plans.
It's very important to make sure that the federal law of
bankruptcy as applied by the bankruptcy courts in the state of
Utah is consistent with the ERISA provisions. ky including
pensions under exempt property in the State of Utah, this
would automatically clear up the confliction thp.t exists
because of the nonconformity with the bankruptcy law, as it's
applied in Utah, and the ERISA provision.
48th Gen. Sess. (Jan. 30, 1989) (statement of Rep. Lunt) (starts at 0 minutes 31 seconds)
(emphasis added). (An audio recording of the legislative history is contained in Aplt.
App. DLG00282.)
While the legislators did not discuss the use of "described in" versus "qualified
under," their frequent reference to qualified plans indicates ijheir intent that the exemption
apply only to Keogh plans that are qualified under IRC §40\(a) u Moreover, the
legislature's purpose in amending the exemption statute to include retirement plans
"described in" various Internal Revenue Code sections was to bring consistency between
federal tax law and Utah exemption laws—not to provide a state exemption for money
contributed to Keogh plans that are not qualified under federal law.
As argued before the district court (Aplt. App. DLG0O38O-OO385), the Trustee
submits that the most probable reason the legislature chose ^'described in" as opposed to
"qualified under" is because of the ten Internal Revenue Cqde sections referenced in
13

Contrary to the Debtor's argument at p. 12, n. 2 of his Tenth Circuit brief, the
issue is not why the legislature chose that term, but what it (meant by that term. The
above quoted legislative intent unequivocally shows that th^ legislature intended to
exempt only those Keogh plans that were qualified under § 401(a). Hence, the legislature
intended to give "described in" the same meaning as "qualified under," at least as applied
to Keogh plans and other plans covered by § 401(a).
15

former § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x). Some of those sections deal with qualified retirement plans
and some do not.
For example, Section 408 is an IRA, which is an investment vehicle recognized by
the IRS. Section 408(a) is a Roth IRA. Section 414(d) is a government plan. Section
414(e) is a church plan. Section 401(k) is a deferred compensation arrangement. It
would not have made sense to require that each of the plans or investment vehicles
referred to in the statute be "qualified," where there is no qualification mechanism for
some of them.14
Hence the legislature chose the words "described in" rather than "qualified under."
Again, however, the only Keogh plans "described in" § 401(a) are qualified plans.
C.

Exemption Law in Other States

Most states with exemption statutes like the Utah statute use the term "qualified
under."15 Courts construing these statutes uniformly hold that nonqualified plans are not

14

The Trustee made this same argument at pp. 18-19 of his opening brief in the
Tenth Circuit. Debtor made no attempt to rebut that argument in his Tenth Circuit brief.
15

See e.g., Plunk v. Yaquinto (In re Plunk), 481 F.3d 302, 304 (5th Cir. 2007)
(analyzing § 42.0021 of the Texas Property Code, which exempts plans that "qualify
under" the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code); In re Goldschein, 244
B.R. 595, 602-03 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000) (analyzing Maryland's exemption statute,
Maryland Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-504(h), which includes a retirement plan
"qualified under" § 401(a)); In re Lawrence, supra, 235 B.R. at 498 (analyzing Florida's
exemption statute, Fla. Stat. § 222.21(2), which exempts plans "qualified under"
§ 401(a)).
16

exempt.

Utah and a few other states use language other th^n "qualified under."

The

only court decision that the Trustee (or the Debtor) has found which interprets an
exemption statute that does not use the term "qualified undeif" is In re Kaplan, supra.
In support of its "plain reading" analysis, the bankruptcy court relied on, but
misconstrued, the holding in Kaplan. There, the Pennsylvania bankruptcy court
interpreted Pennsylvania's exemption statute, which exempts from attachment or
execution on a judgment "[a]ny retirement or annuity fund provided for under section
401(a). . . ." Kaplan, 162 B.R. at 689 (emphasis added).
In Kaplan, the court "observe[d] that the language of|[the Pennsylvania exemption
statute] is very broad, and that it appears to have been drafted to include even plans
i 0

which are not technically 'tax qualified' within its scope." \d. at 697.

The court,

however, ultimately determined that the exempt status of th? debtor's plan depended
precisely on the plan's qualification under the IRC:
We have not been asked to, and therefore did not, purport to make
any sort of determination regarding the IRC qualification of the
Debtor's plan. . .. If the IRS should rule, in tpe future, that the Plan
16

See Plunk, supra, 481 F.3d at 304 (pension plan held not exempt" because the
debtor's misuse of plan assets disqualified the plan); In re Cfoldschein, supra, 244 B.R. at
602-03 (retirement plan was disqualified and, therefore, not] exempt because the debtor
violated the plan provisions by including his wife, a non-employ ee, as a beneficiary and
by obtaining improper loans from the plan); In re Lawrence^, supra, 235 B.R. at 510 (the
plan did not qualify under § 401(a) and, therefore, was not Exempt).
17

See, e.g., 42 Pa.C.S. § 8124 (Pennsylvania's exemption statute including "[a]ny
retirement or annuity fund provided for under section 401(a). . ."); Hawaii Rev. Stat.
§651-124 (Hawaii's exemption statute including "a plan or| arrangement described in
section 401(a)...").
l o

In his Tenth Circuit brief, the Debtor appears to l^ave characterized this portion
of the Kaplan decision as its holding, when it is actually dictum.
17

is not tax qualified under the IRC, it would appear that the Plan
would be of limited use to the Debtor. Furthermore, were the Plan
disqualified under the IRC, it would appear inequitable for us to
preclude [the objecting creditor] from ever reaching the funds
contained in it. For this reason, we condition the future effect of our
ruling that the Plan is exempt on the Plan's continuing qualification.
. .. If the IRS intervenes at a later date and disqualifies the Plan,
then and only then would it appear to us appropriate to preclude the
Debtor from continuing to assert that its proceeds are exempt from
claims of the Debtor's creditors.
Id. (emphasis added).19
Thus, as shown by the language quoted above, here the bankruptcy court's
construction of the holding in Kaplan as merely "that the debtor's plan was exempt under
the Pennsylvania exemption statute" (Add. B hereto, p. 427/19-21) is incomplete and
erroneous. Notwithstanding that the phrase "provided for under" was different from
"qualified under," the Kaplan court recognized that to be a plan "provided for under
section 401(a)," the plan needed to be one that was qualified under § 401(a). The same is

19

This portion of the Kaplan decision was the actual outcome of the case (which
the Debtor mischaracterized as "dicta" at p. 11 of his Tenth Circuit brief). While Kaplan
tied the above-quoted "condition" to whether or not the IRS subsequently disqualified the
plan, it did so only because, unlike the bankruptcy court here, it was not asked to
determine, and therefore did not determine, whether the plan there was qualified. Thus,
the proper reading of Kaplan is that the "provided for" language in the Pennsylvania
exemption statute, which is not materially different than the "described in" language of
the Utah exemption statute, was intended to mean the same as "qualified under" § 401(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code which, after all, is a tax qualification statute. Moreover,
had the Kaplan court been asked to determine the tax qualification issue, as the
bankruptcy court here was asked to do, it would have been proper for Kaplan to do so, as
the bankruptcy court here did. See Plunk, supra, 481 F.3d at 307 (bankruptcy court has
jurisdiction to determine whether a pension plan is qualified, and therefore exempt, based
upon disqualifying event that occurs after the IRS has last determined that the plan is
qualified).
18

true here. To be a plan "described in" § 401(a) under the Utfrh exemption statute, the
Debtor's alleged Keogh plan must have been a plan qualified under § 401(a).20
II.

IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT "^ESCRIBED IN"
MEANS SOMETHING LESS THAN "QUALIFIED UNDER"
SECTION 401(a), IT SHOULD EXPLAIN WHAT
"DESCRIBED IN" MEANS

Aside from opining that "described in" is broader thap "qualified under" (Add. B
hereto, pp. 428/22-429/1), the bankruptcy court did not define what it thought "described
in" meant. The bankruptcy court further did not explain wh^t facts it relied on to
determine that the Debtor's nonqualified plan fell within th0 Utah statute.

90

At p. 11, n. 1 of his Tenth Circuit brief, Reinhart Argued that ". . . many courts
have held that an ERISA qualified retirement plan need not be tax qualified in order to be
excluded from the bankruptcy estate." (Citations omitted.) However, as the cases
Reinhart cites in support of that proposition make clear, that is a different issue than the
exemption issue before this court. Under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2), a debtor's retirement
plan that contains a spendthrift or anti-alienation provision Enforceable under
nonbankruptcy law (including ERISA) is not included as property of the debtor's estate
Such provisions are enforceable under ERISA, but only if tljiere are more participants in
the plan than just the debtor (and the debtor's spouse). See) Raymond B. Yates, M.D.,
P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 21 and n. 6 (2004). Because Reinhart is
the only participant in his plan, it is included as property of Ithe estate, which would also
be true even if the plan covered his wife, as it was required, but failed, to do. Id.
Typically, a court would not even reach the exemption issuE, until it determined that the
pension plan was property of the estate. (Add. B hereto, Aplt. App. DLG00044/5-13.)
Here, Reinhart never contended in the bankruptcy court tha); his plan was excluded from
the estate, and the bankruptcy court (correctly) found that tljie plan was property of the
estate. (Add. B hereto, Aplt. App. DLG00044/5-00046/4.) Thus, the exemption issue
was the issue before the bankruptcy court, the district courtj and the Tenth Circuit, and is
the issue before this Court, not whether the Keogh plan wa$ property of the estate.
21

In his briefs in the district court (Aplt. App. DLGf)0306-00325) and in the
Tenth Circuit, the Debtor similarly failed to define the degree to which a plan can be set
up and/or operated outside of the requirements of § 401(a) tad still be a plan "described
in" § 401(a).
19

Obviously, there must be some relationship between a plan that is "described in"
§ 401(a) and a plan that is set up and operated according to the requirements of § 401(a).
However, without the bankruptcy court or district court having defined what that
relationship is, it presently stands as an "I know it when I see it" proposition. That is an
unacceptable interpretation of the Utah exemption statute.
Thus, if this Court determines that "described in" means something less than
"qualified under" § 401(a), it should explain the standards for determining what
"described in" means by reference to the facts of this case. For example, the Court
should answer the following questions:
1.

Whether the Debtor's plan is "described in" § 401(a) where the

Debtor was required to have the plan cover all eligible employees (Aplt. App.
DLG00208/16-19; Add. B hereto, p. 420/3-4) but the plan did not cover the Debtor's
wife, Janet, (a) who was the only other eligible employee besides the Debtor, (b) who
requested that the Debtor (who was the plan administrator) include her as a plan
participant, but (c) who, nevertheless, was never included as a participant and thus never
received any of the mandatory or discretionary contributions provided for under the
plan.22 [Aplt. App. DLG00017-19, % 4k, 1, v, w, x, y, z, aa, DLG00191-00199 (Tr. 89/2392/8), DLG00275-00280).]

This question could also be phrased as whether the plan is "described in"
§ 401(a) where the Debtor caused the plan to exclude from coverage 50% of eligible
employees for 100% of the plan years prior to the Petition Date. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 401(a)(3) [a plan is "qualified" if "the plan of which such trust is a part satisfies the
requirements of section 410 (relating to minimum participation standards). . . ."]; see
also Myron v. United States, 550 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1977) (plan of two corporations
disqualified where sole shareholder failed to include 5 employees who were eligible for
20

2.

Whether the plan is "described in" § 40 Ka) where (a) the Debtor

ceased to be self employed and became an employee of the PC in January, 1996, (b) the
Debtor thereafter caused the PC to continue making contributions on the Debtor's behalf
as if he remained self employed, and (c) the Debtor did not cftuse the PC to adopt and
restate the plan as a corporate pension plan until August 16, £001 (more than a year and a
half after the Petition Date, and after the Trustee had filed hi$ objection).23 (Aplt. App.
DLGOOO 16-00017,14a, e5 f, g, h, DLGOOO 18, ^ 4p, q, DLG00141-00149; Add. B hereto,
pp. 417/14-418/1.)
3.

Whether the plan is "described in" § 401(a) where, under the money

purchase plan component, the Debtor was required to make contributions of 10% of each
participant's annual compensation, but failed to do so. 24 [Aplt. App. DLG00100,
DLG00122, §§ 3.1(b) and (d).]
4.

Whether the plan is "described in" § 4011(a) where the Debtor

disregarded that plan requirement that contributions be made exclusively through Schwab
1

coverage but not included as participants); cf In re Goldseke in, supra (plan disqualified,
and therefore not exempt, because debtor, who was principal in company, caused his
wife, a non-employee, to be included as a beneficiary in the) company pension plan, and
because the debtor obtained loans from the plan in violation of plan restrictions).
2j

This question could also be phrased as whether the plan is "described in"
§ 401(a) where for four of the last seven plan years before tne Petition Date, the Debtor
caused 100% of the contributions to be made for his benefit to a plan not adopted or
maintained by his employer. A "qualified" plan under § 401(a) must be one that is
established and maintained by the "employer." 26 U.S.C. § 401. As discussed above, a
plan established and maintained by a person other than an employer is not a qualified
plan.
24

This question could also be phrased as whether the plan is "described in"
§ 401(a) where the Debtor made 0% of the required contributions to the money purchase
plan for four of the last seven plan years before the Petition Date.
21

as the plan "custodian" [Id. at 3.1(d)], and the Debtor directed investments through
himself as the self-designated "trustee" of the plan, including a $10,400 contribution to
fund the Parker Loan. (Aplt. App. DLG 00018, ^ 4u, DLG00101-00112.)
5.

Whether the plan is "described in" § 401(a) where, for the year

2000, the Debtor caused contributions to be made of $1,455.75 in excess of the maximum
contribution limits under § 415 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code.25 (Aplt. App.
DLG00100, DLG00136-00140, DLG00177-00178.)
6.

Whether the plan is "described in" § 401(a) where the bankruptcy

court found it to be "operationally in default" on the Petition Date. (Add. B hereto, p.
428/13-14.) See 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-l(b)(3) ("The law is concerned not only with the form
of the plan but also with its effects in operation."); Cornell-Young Co. v. U.S., 469 F.2d
1318, 1324 (5th Cir. 1972) ("[T]he law looks not only to the form of the plan but also to
its operation") (citation omitted).
7.

Whether the plan is "described in" § 401(a) where the Debtor failed

to use EPCRS to correct the plan's operational defaults prior to the Petition Date (or
ever), and exemptions are determined as of the Petition Date (In re Rowe, supra),
notwithstanding Internal Revenue Code provisions permitting retroactive cure of plan
disqualification {In re Lawrence, supra).

This question could also be phrased as whether the plan is described in § 401(a)
where for the plan year immediately preceding the Petition Date, 100% of that year's
contributions were unauthorized.
26

Mr. Lloyd consistently testified that, under IRS policies and procedures, a
successful use of EPCRS does not provide a retroactive change to a plan's disqualified
status. Rather, it "is merely an agreement between the plan sponsor and the IRS that the
22

8.

Whether the plan is "described in" § 401(a) where, under EPCRS,

the Debtor would have had to use the VCP rather than the SOP, and thereby admit that
the plan was in default on the Petition Date, pay a compliance fee, fund approximately
$30,000 with respect to the default regarding the failure to in|clude Janet in the plan, and
obtain IRS approval of remedial measures taken. (Aplt. App. DLG00231-00233, pp.
129/20-131/10, DLG00248-00251.) See also Rev. Proc. 2006-27 § 10,1.R.B. 2006-22.
The Trustee submits that there are no meaningful standards that could be applied
to determine that the Debtor's nonqualified Keogh plan is nonetheless "described in"
§ 401(a), within the meaning of the Utah exemption statute, based on the facts of this
case.

IRS will not impose the sanction, the tax sanctions that they iwould otherwise be allowed
to impose because of the plan failures and operation." (Apllj. App. DLG00233, p.
131/11-19.)
Also, the effects under EPCRS are limited. More specifically, EPCRS "ha[s] no effect
on the rights of any party under any other law, including Title I of ERISA." Rev. Proc.
2006-27 § 6.12,1.R.B. 2006-22. Accordingly, the rights of me Trustee and creditors for
turnover of the funds in the Debtor's unqualified Keogh plan as of the Petition Date
would not be affected by later correction of plan defaults under EPCRS.
On pp. 15-16 of his Tenth Circuit Brief, the Debtor argued that his operational
defaults were correctable post-petition. However, the cases the Debtor cited at pp. 15-16
of his Tenth Circuit brief do not support his argument. His quote from In re Copulos,
210 B.R. 61, 65 (Bankr. D. NJ. 1997), reversed in part on other grounds, First Indem of
Am Ins Co v Copulos, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6672 (D. NJ. February 24. 1998) is
dictum, because the court determined that the plan there wai tax qualified. The postpetition plan amendment in In re Rosenbloom, 132 B.R. 970, 972 (S.D. Fla. 1991) was
administrative only and did not affect qualification. In re Baker, 195 B.R 386, 393
(Bankr. N.D. 111. 1996), atfd, 114 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 1997) does not suggest that the
absence of an IRS disqualification decision, by itself, requires a bankruptcy court to
determine that a plan is tax qualified. To the contrary, see Plunk, supra. The other
argument the Debtor made on p. 16 of his Tenth Circuit bri^f, that the Trustee seeks
different treatment of the Debtor's plan based on his bankruptcy status, is also
unsupported. Because the plan is not protected by the Utah exemption statute, the
Debtor's creditors can reach it. The Trustee merely stands in the shoes of those creditors.
23

CONCLUSION
As shown above, in interpreting the Utah exemption statute as exempting Keogh
plans that are not qualified under § 401(a), the bankruptcy court and district court ignored
the plain language of the statute and its legislative history and misconstrued the Kaplan
decision interpreting a similar Pennsylvania exemption statute. The bankruptcy court and
district court also substituted their judgment for that of the legislature, by adopting some
undefined (and undefinable) approach that while certain plan defaults are serious enough
to disqualify a Keogh Plan for tax purposes, they are not serious enough to disqualify a
plan for exemption purposes. There is no reasoned support for such an approach.
This Court should determine that because the Debtor's alleged Keogh plan was not
qualified on the Petition Date, as the Tenth Circuit determined, the plan was not a plan
"described in" § 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, within the meaning of former Utah
Code Ann. § 78-23-5 (l)(a)(x) (2000), and, therefore, was not exempt.
DATED this 6th day of May, 2010.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
A Professional Corporation
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
In re

Banljxuptcy Case Number

DOUGLAS JAMES RELNHART,
Debtor.

00-20995 WTT
[Chapter 7]

ORDER ON TRUSTEE'S OBJECTION TO EXEMPTIONS
The matter of the Trustee's Objection to Exemptions, filed in this case on June 15, 2000
(the "Objection"), which concerned the Debtor's claimed exemption in and to funds held in the
Debtor's "Keogh" plan (the "Funds"), came on for trial on the 1$*, 14th, and 15th days of May,
2008, before the Honorable William T. Thurman, United States Bankniptcy Judge. The Debtor
appeared in person and was represented by Duane H- Gillman ahd Michael F. Thomson of

10th Cif. Aplt App

SLC 202U7.1

Filed: 05/21/08

DLG00027

DLG APP0016

Durham Jones & Pinegar. The Trustee was represented by Adam S. Affleck and Andrew B.
Clawson of Prince Yeates & Geldzahler.
The Court, having judged the credibility of the witnesses, having considered the
documents admitted into evidence, and having heard the arguments of counsel, rendered its
findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. Based on such findings and conclusions,
which are incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Objection is OVERRULED pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-235(l)(a)(x) (2000); and it is further
ORDERED that the Objection is SUSTAINED pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-235(l)(b)(2) (2000) as to $20,400.00 of the Funds; and it is further
ORDERED that the Funds are exempt, except for $20,400.00 of the Funds; and it is
further
ORDERED that a separate turnover order shall be entered requiring the Debtor to
turnover $20,400.00 of the Funds to the Trustee; and it is further
ORDERED that the Court reserves the right to supplement its findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and this Order with a written opinion at a later time.
END OF D O CUMENT
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, THURSDAY, MAY 15, 2008, 2:36 P.M.
* * * * *

(Call to Order of the Court)
THE COURT:

Good afternoon.

patience with the Court.
2:00 o'clock.

Thank you for your

I thought we'd be ready to go at

We did a couple of more edits and found a

couple of typos, and I hope I don't make some grammatical
errors when we read this into the record, but I appreciate
your attendance here.
Just for the record, this is the third day of our trial
in this contested matter in the Reinhart case, and I would
just like the record to identify that we have parties here.
Could you just state your names on the record.

Let's go

over here first.
MR. CLAWSON:

Andrew Clawson and Adam Affleck on behalf

of the Trustee.
MR. GILLMAN:

Duane Gillman and Michael Thompson on

behalf of Dr. Reinhart.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

The matter before the

Court in this contested matter is brought under the
Bankruptcy Code 11 USC 522 B and interpretation of Utah Code
78-23-5-1 (a) (x) 2000, year 2000, to determine the exemption
of property claimed by the Debtor Douglas James Reinhart,
referred to as "the debtor" throughout this decision, as
opposed to the Trustee, David Gladwell, who I refer to as
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"the Trustee" in this decision.

And it's ^ny obligation to

determine if property's exempt in this estate.
The Court has conducted a three-day tjrial on this on
May 13, 14 and today, the 15th.

The parties appeared and

presented evidence, and I received their oiral arguments and
have reviewed all their submissions, and I have reviewed
those and I've made my own conclusion and £one our own
research to determine the matters before the Court, and
based upon those, the Court makes the following findings and
conclusions.
Jurisdiction is appropriate in this qourt.
really contested that.

No one's

And I find that jurisdiction is

appropriate in this contested matter pursuant to 28 USC 1334
and 157(b) (2) .

The Court specifically fii^ds that this is

subject to the Court's core jurisdiction \lnder 28 USC
157(b)(2)1.

Venue is appropriate under 1409(a).

Notice is

deemed appropriate for this trial in all Respects.
see.

I should have said 1408.

appropriate.

Let's

1408(a) vinue is

Notice of the hearing is appropriate in all

respects.
The debtor filed for voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy on
January 28, 2000, by filing a petition on that date which
initiated a Chapter 7 case.

On May 16, 2000, the debtor

filed amended schedules claiming an exemption under Utah
Code 78-23-5-1 (a) (x) 2000 in property described as a Keogh
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which then had a market value of $306,000, according to the
schedules.

On June 15, 2000, the Trustee filed an

objection, which I find was timely, objecting to the
exemption.

On September 5, 2006, the debtor filed amended

schedules claiming the same exemption in the Keogh, but
increasing -- but increased the market value of the
exemption to $333,835.65.

Sometimes I refer to that as the

fund or the property in question as we go through this.
From 1992 to the petition date, the debtor worked as an
anesthesiologist in Ogden, Utah.

From 1992 to December 31,

1995, the debtor operated as a sole proprietor.

On December

6, 1992, the debtor, in his capacity as a sole proprietor,
established a Charles Schwaub & Company -- I refer to that
as Schwaub sometimes -- combination plan, or I sometimes
refer to that as Keogh plan which is a Schwaub plan, that
combines a money purchase plan, which 1 sometimes call MPP
plan, and a profit sharing plan, and they were adopted by
the same because he -- as he was the employer.
The debtor was the plan administrator of the
combination plan, but Schwaub was the plan custodian.

The

employee eligibility requirements for participation in the
combination plan were zero years of service and 21 years of
age.

The vesting schedule for contributions to the

combination plan were 100 percent vested immediately.

The

mandatory contribution rate for contributions to the MPP
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plan portion of the combination plan was \L0 percent of the
participant's salary.

The debtor had always been a sole

participant in -- has always been the sol^ participant in
the combination plan for all times applicable.
From 199 -- between 1992 and January 1, '96, the debtor
made several contributions to the combination plan on behalf
of himself.

In '92 it was $5452 to the n^oney purchase plan,

4548 for the profit sharing for a total c}f $10,000.

In 1993

it was 13,489 to the money purchase plan, 16,511 to the
profit sharing for a total of 30,000.

Ir^ 1994 14,740 to the

money purchase plan, 15,260 for the profit sharing for a
total of 30,000.

In 1995 13,563 to the nfioney purchase plan

and 3437 to the profit sharing plan for $ total of $17,000.
On January 1, 1996, the debtor incotporated as the
Douglas Reinhart, MD, PC.

I sometimes r^fer to that as the

PC as we go through this.

From January 1, '96, to the

petition date, the debtor was the sole shareholder and
president of the PC.

Upon incorporation of the PC on

January 1, 1996, the debtor ceased to be an -

to be

self-employed, and became an employee of the PC.

After the

PC was incorporated, the debtor caused t^ae PC to continue to
make contributions to the combination pl^n.

From 1996

through the petition date neither the debtor nor the PC made
any contributions to the MPP portion of the combination
plan.

The PC did not adopt the Schwaub retirement plan
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until August 16, 2001.

I pulled that from Exhibit K.

On February 1, 2003, the PC amended the MPP plan
effective December 31, 2003, to reduce the plan contribution
rate to zero percent so that future benefits would cease to
accrue in the plan as of that date and time, and the plan
and all of its assets were to be merged into the Douglas J.
Reinhart, MD, PC profit sharing plan effective December 31,
2003.

All that is derived from Exhibit L.

At or around December 31, 1998, the PC issued Check No.
1062 dated December 31, 1998, to make a $10,000 contribution
to the profit sharing portion of the combination plan.
is from the Trustee's Exhibit 12.

This

The drawee bank did not

pay the Check No. 1062 until February 10, 1999.

In other

words, the check did not clear the PC's account until after
the petition -- excuse me -- until that date, which was the
December - - o r excuse me -- February 10, 1999.
Additionally, two checks dated December 17, '99, Checks
No. 1446 and 13 -- 1346 and 1347 in the amounts of $1,534.92
and $8,865.08 respectfully, the debtor, one, caused the PC
to contribute $10,400 to the Douglas J. Reinhart, MD, PC
retirement plans, and, two, caused the Douglas J. Reinhart,
MD, PC retirement plan to loan $10,400 to Colleen Parker,
which I refer to as the Parker loan.

All that is more

particularly set forth in Trustee's Exhibit 14.
The terms of the combination plan and the custodial
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account agreement require that all contributions be made
through the combination plan custodial account.

The

contribution of the Parker loan was not mac$e through the
combination plan custodial account; however, the amount of
the loan, when compared to the total amount of plan that is
the subject to this contested matter, is approximately three
percent of the total contributions.
From 1993 to 1996, Janet Reinhart -- Sometimes I refer
to her as Janet for convenience of the disctussion -- was
employed by the debtor in his sole proprietor capacity.
From 1996 to the petition date, Janet was employed by the PC
as an employee.

From 1993 to 2000, Janet teceived wages

from the debtor either from - - a s the sole proprietor or an
employee as the —

from the PC as follows:

11,444, 1993;

11,444, '94; 12,994, '95; 12,466 in «96; $X8,913 in '97;
21,492 in

l

9 8 ; 20,633 in '99, and 11,845 ±i|i 2000.

Janet was over the age of 21 in 1992, and met all the
requirements to be a participant in the coifibination plan
from the date of her employment to the dat^ of the petition.
From 1993 to the date of petition, Janet w£s never made a
participant in the combination plan.

Additionally, no

contributions to the combination plan were made on behalf of
Janet during that time period.

At the tri^JL on this matter,

Janet testified that she did not recall haying any
discussions with the debtor regarding the Combination plan.
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She was not aware that she was entitled to participate in
such a plan, and she never signed a waiver of participation
in the plan.

The plan documents of the combination plan did

not permit exclusion of eligible employees.
There are basically three issues before the Court that
it must determine.

First, whether the combination plan is

exempt from the estate, or not included in the estate is a
better way to phrase it under 541(c) (2) . Second, if the
combination plan is property of the estate, whether the
property is exempt under Utah Code 78-23-5 -1(a) (x) . Now,
when I refer to that 78-23-5-1 (a) (x) , I'm referring to the
code that was in effect in the year 2000, no amendment since
then.

And, three, whether the $10,000 check of December 31,

'98, from the PC to the combination plan and the Parker loan
in the amount of 10,400 should be deemed contributions made
by or on behalf of the debtor within one year of the
petition date.
The burden of proving the subject property!s not exempt
rests with the party objecting to the claimed exemption.
That's under Rule 4003 and, also, the Doyle case which I
pulled from the Northern District of Illinois.

Once the

objecting party has made a prima fascia case, the burden
shifts to the debtor to prove that such property is excluded
from the estate.
yesterday.

Now, I flagged this for the parties

I don't know if you went and read it, but that!s
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the Judge Bolden case.

That's the Hahn case decided in 1992

where she cites the BI Financial Services Group, Inc. case,
a 9th Circuit case in 1998.

And I hope [you enjoyed reading

those cases that I gave you.
I am going to find that the combination plan is
property of the estate.

Although the patrrties did not argue

whether the funds in the combination are| property of the
estate, the Court believes that the threshold issue that
should be resolved before evaluating whether the funds may
be exempt under Utah law is that.

As the Supreme Court

pointed out in Owen vs., Owen, "No property can be exempted
and, thereby, immunized, however, unless it falls within the
bankruptcy estate."

So that wasn't reallly teed up.

It

seemed like both of you had made a presumption or assumption
that this really wasn't

an issue, but the debtor actually

listed the Keogh as property of the estate and then exempted
it.

And so I was tempted -- I mean, I Was really tempted to

go down the property of the estate analysis.

That will be

another day in another case.
Section 541(a) (1) broadly defines v^hat interests
comprise property of the estate and defines that all legal
or equitable interest of the debtor and {property as of
commencement of the case.

541(c)(2), hc^wever, excludes from

the estate certain interest of the debtor and specifically
states, "A restriction on a transfer of beneficial interest
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of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under
applicable law and bankruptcy law is enforceable in a
bankruptcy case."
In interpreting 541(c)(2), the Supreme Court, in
Patterson vs. Shumate, concluded that the debtor's interest
in an ARISA qualified retirement plan was excluded from
property of the estate under 541(c) (2); however, the Supreme
Court did not define the ARISA qualified.

Since Patterson

several Courts have struggled, as this Court has, in looking
at this matter with the definition of ARISA qualified.
of In re: Baker.

Case

And I think we picked that up by

somebody's brief, but we did some more research and found
that on a cross-reference on some other matters.

In re:

Baker out of the 7th Circuit decided by Judge Schwartz.
Now, I find that a very interesting case.
really made a big deal about that.

No one

Judge Schwartz is a very

highly respected jurist around the country, ajid whenever I
go to bankruptcy seminars and the like, they always have the
John Schwartz Roundtable and judges at the NCBJ conferences
go participate in the Schwartz roundtable, I think, out of
respect of him and his decisions.
But he decided and he stated that Courts have struggled
defining ARISA qualified plans, and he cited two or three
cases when he decided the Baker case, In re: Baker, the
Bennett case

out of Eastern District of New York, the Haines
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case out of the Eastern District of Virginia.

Hall out of

the Western District of Michigan, Serus o^it of the District
of Massachusetts.

The Court can find no Controlling

precedent on this issue in the lOthe Circuit.
The Trustee argues that because of certain unremedied
operational failures, the combination plah was not a
qualified plan on the date of the petition-

Specifically

Trustee's expert, Wally Lloyd, testified ^he debtors' Keogh
plan failed to be a qualified plan under IRC 401(a) because
of certain operational failures.

One, th£t the plan failed

to cover the -- and provide benefits for all eligible
employees; namely, Janet.

Two, the debtor caused plan

assets to be diverted into an impermissible investment when
the debtor made a $10,400 loan to Mrs. Pairker. Three, for
the plan year commencing January 1, 2000, the debtor caused
the PC to make and allocate a contribution to the plan in
excess of the limits of IRC 415(c) which was $1455.75 in
excess of the cap.

And, four, since 1996^ the debtor failed

to make the required contributions of 10 percent of the
participant's salary to the MPP plan despjlte the specific
plan requirements to do so.

And Exhibit t-- Debtor Exhibit

KK spells that out.
On the last point, Mr. Wally Lloyd testified that
although there was an attempt to retroactively fix the MPP,
no retroactive fixes were made, and he opened in his
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opinion, in both his opinion letter and his supplement, that
the plan was not qualified.

Mr. Lloyd further testified

that the -- all of these operational failures were remedial,
however.

He noted that employers such as the debtor are

allowed to modify or make changes to their plans or rights
such as benefits accrued, and participation cannot be taken
away retroactively.
The Court determines that Mr. Lloyd is a credible
witness and is persuaded by Mr. Lloyd's opinion that the
Keogh plan may not be a qualified plan under IRC 401(a)
because of the operational failures stated.

The Court,

however, notes that there has been no evidence presented
showing that the IRS has disqualified the plan, so we've got
parties arguing about what the IRS is going to do, but the
IRS is not a party.

And I want to make it clear whatever

our rule, it's not binding on someone who is not here today.
Now, the Court again recognizes that neither party has
argued whether or not the Keogh plan is property of the
estate.

It hears you both assume it is, and, indeed, the

debtor's gone down that track.

Accordingly, based upon the

evidence presented and Mr. Lloyd's testimony, the Court
determines that the Keogh plan is property of the estate
under 541(a) for the purposes of this decision.

And I think

that's consistent what that the Supreme Court says I have to
do in making a determination.

It's a threshold question
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under Owen that I ought to make that finding.

But, like I

said, since neither one of you took a strong position or
took a position that it wasn't property of the estate, I'm
not going down that -- that trail.
Although the plan is property of the estate, the Court
determines it is exempt under Utah Code 78-23-5-1(a)(x).
Since the Court has determined that the Keogh plan is
property of the estate, the Court next will give its
analysis of why it's exempt under Utah law.

The Court

recognizes that it must "Construe exemption statutes
liberally in favor of the debtor to protect him and his
family from hardship," as stated by the Utal^ Supreme Court
in the case of In re: Kuntz which has been edited to the
Court.

Under Utah Code 78-23-5-1 (a) (x) , "Ai^ individual is

entitled to an exemption of the money or other assets held
for or payable to an individual as a participant or
beneficiary from or an interest of an individual as a
participant or beneficiary in a retirement pjlan or an
arrangement that is described in Section 40i(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986."
The Trustee recognizes that certain property that is
held in a retirement plan described in Section 401(a) of the
IRC is exempt under Utah law; however, the ifrustee argues
that the plan under 401(a) must be a qualified plan in order
to be exempt.

Under Utah law the Trustee then concludes
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that it follows that a plan that is described in 401(a)
would necessarily be qualified under 401(a).
The debtor, on the other hand, argues that there
is a distinction between the term described in and the term
qualified, and the debtor asserts that the Trustee wants to
amend the Utah exemption statute to get rid of the term
described in.

That's the -- that was Mr. Gillman's closing

argument yesterday.

The debtor further argues that the

Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. Shumate did not
determine qualified, hence, the Utah Legislature, in
drafting 78-23-5-1(a)(x), elected to abandon the term
qualified and adopted a much broader term of described in.
The Court finds the reasoning and the ruling of In
re: Kaplan, cited by the parties from the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, particularly instructive.

In Kaplan the

Court considered whether the debtor's pension plan and IRA
account were exempt under Pennsylvania's exemption statute.
The statute, in relevant part, states, "Any retirement or
annuity fund provided for under 4 01(a) the IRC of 1986 shall
be exempt from attachment or execution,"
Pennsylvania statute.

Thatfs the

"A creditor objected to the debtor's

claimed exemption arguing that in order for the Pennsylvania
exemption statute to apply, the plan had to be a
tax-qualified plan provided for under IR" -- "under the
Internal Revenue Code. " That' s a quote from the Kaplan case
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as well.

In support of its position, the creditor cited

several cas&s which show that the plans losft their
tax-qualified status due to violations of t^ie Internal
Revenue Code.
The Kaplan Court denied the creditor's objection
to the claimed exemption and actually overruled the
objection holding that, "The specific langiiage of the
Pennsylvania exemption statute issue does riot provide that a
retirement fund to be exempt must arise frc^m a qualified
plan."

The Court went on to point out that^, Neither the

word qualified nor the word plan appear anywhere in the
legislation.

Rather, the statute provides for an exemption

for a fund provided for under sections of the Internal
Revenue Code.

The Court explained the language used in the

Pennsylvania exemption statute was broader than the statutes
at issue in the cases cited by the creditor.

The Kaplan

Court further noted that the Pennsylvania exemption statute
was, "Drafted to include even plans which kre not
technically tax qualified within its scope|. " The Court
concluded that the debtor • s plan was exempt under the
Pennsylvania exemption statute.
As in Kaplan, the Court determines that the Utah
exemption statute codified in 78-23-5-1 (a) (x) is similar to
the broad language of the Pennsylvania exemption statute.
The Utah exemption statute does not require that for a plan
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to be exempt, it must be qualified under 401(a) of the
j. Internal Revenue Code.

In fact, like the Pennsylvania

exemption statute, the word qualified does not appear
anywhere in 78-23-5-1 (a) (x) . The Court believes that there
are some merit to the use of the word described in as
opposed to the use of the word qualified in the Utah
statute.

Given the broad language of 78-23-5-1(a) (x) , the

Court finds that the Keogh plan, while arguably not tax
qualified, is, nonetheless, described in Section 401(a).
Accordingly, the Court finds that based upon the plain
reading of 78-23-5-l(a) (x) , the debtor's Keogh plan is
exempt.
The Court further notes that there are several
areas where the plan was operationally in default.
Mr. Lloyd talked about that.

In fact,

The Court recognized that

these operational failures should be corrected; however, I
think, in one case we looked at there was given time under
the particular case to allow those corrections to be made
before coming back to the Court.
Chapter 11 case.

I think that was in a

That's not our situation here, so I'm not

going to order it, but I'm just saying somebody needs to
take a look at them.

However, since the Court determines

that qualified under 401(a) is a higher standard than
described in 78-23-5-1(a)(x), the debtor need not present
strict compliance with the Internal Revenue Code
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requirements to claim the exemption.
The Court is aware of the cases cited by the
Trustee; mainly, In re: Lawrence from Florida, In re: Gold
and In re: Goldsheim from Maryland from my cjood friend Judge
Kier who I'm going to see in another week oxt two, and 1*11
tell him we looked at his case and others.

Those cases

interpreted the relevant state exemption statutes which
require the plans to be qualified under the applicable
section of the Internal Revenue Code in ord^r to be exempt.
The court finds that these cases are distinguishable because
the Utah exemption statute uses broader language than the
language used in the exemption statutes in tjhose cases.
The Court has also reviewed the Supreme Court case
of Yeates vs. Hendon invoked by the Trustee in his opening
and closing arguments.

At first glance this case does

appear to have some impact on the legitimacy of the debtor's
Keogh plan because the Supreme Court ruled that to be a part
of the --an ARISA plan, there must be more employees than
just the owner and the owner's spouse.

Thi$ Court, however,

finds that Yeates specifically deals with ttye ARISA Title I
employee benefit plans in which the employed acts as an
administrator and trustee of the plan funds for multiple
employees.
Keogh plan.

This is not the case here with tthe debtor's
Yeates refers to 29 CFR 2510.3+3 (b) 2003 which

states that, "A so-called Keogh or HR-10 pl^n under which

10th Cir Aplt App

DLG00052
DLGAPP0041

430
only partners or only a sole proprietor participants covered
under the plan will not be covered under Title I. "

Yeates

also recites to Schwartz vs. Gordon which clarifies the
difference between the ARISA Title I and Title II
situations.

Schwartz states that there is a distinction

drawn between the definition of employee benefit plan, as
used in Title I, for protection of workers employed by
others, and the definition of the term as used in Title II,
to ensure tax benefits on an equal basis to self-employed
individuals and others with respect to their retirement
funds.

Schwartz further notes that the Self-Employed

Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962 permits a
self-employed individual to establish his own pension plan,
commonly called a Keogh plan, and to qualify for certain
favorable tax benefits.
Based upon this Court • s view of Yeates and the
explanation provided under the distinction between the ARISA
Title I and Title II plans, as clarified in the Schwartz
case -- now, the Schwartz case is a 2nd Circuit case 1985,
but I find it persuasive to this Court, and I elect to
follow its reasoning.

And based upon those explanations and

distinction, the Court determines that Yeates is factually
distinguishable and is not controlling in this case because
the Keogh plan here does not fall under Title I that was
discussed in Yeates.
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Now, that's the broad overview.
10,000 and the 10,4 checks.

There's still the

The Court next considers those

issues of whether the 10,000 check date# December 31, '98,
from the PC to the combination plan and the $10,400 loan
made to Colleen Parker on December 17, '99, should be deemed
contributions made or on behalf of the debtor within one
year of the petition date.
The Trustee argued that even jlf the plan is exempt
or the funds in the plan exempt -- and t want to make it
clear here.

Sometimes I refer to the p}.an being exempt.

It's really the funds in the plan being exempt.

The

contributions may --he argues that the contributions were
made within one year of the filing and, therefore, not
exempt under 78-23-5-1(b)(ii).

The Trustee argues that the

two contributions were made within one year of the petition.
The first non-exempt contribution, he argues, is the $10,000
check dated December 31, '98, but not deposited by Charles
Schwaub until February '99. The second non-exempt
contribution is 10,400 based upon the checks of December 17,
1999, which was a payment to the fund which was then
immediately loaned out to Colleen Parket.
The Trustee asserts both of tl^ese payments were
within one year of the petition date, January 28, 2000.

The

Trustee realized on the cases that inteitpret the preference
laws for the proposition that the effective date of the
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transfer is a date that the check clears the drawee bank.
Specifically, the Trustee invokes Barnhill vs. Johnson from
our U.S. Supreme Court 1992 which states that there is no
transfer until a check is honored because, until that time,
the debtor retains an interest in the property.
Under 78-23-5-(b)(ii), the exemption granted by
Subsection 1(a)(x) does not apply to amounts contributed or
benefits accrued by or on behalf of the debtor within one
year before the debtor files for bankruptcy.

There was a

$10,000 contribution to the plan that was made by the PC and
not the debtors

The statute, however, clearly states that

any amounts contributed by or on behalf of a debtor within
one year before the debtor files bankruptcy are not exempt.
The Court determines that the contribution of the
PC was on behalf of the debtor.

The Court is further

persuaded that the cases supporting the preference theory
that the effective date of the contribution was February 10,
1999.

Accordingly, the Court finds and concludes that the

contribution of that amount was made within one year of the
date of the petition and, therefore, not exempt.
As for the Parker loan of 10,400 paid by two
checks dated December 17, * 99, respectfully, the parties
stipulated that this was a contribution to the plan as
conspicuously noted on the checks.

That's Exhibit --

Trustee's Exhibit 14. Specifically, the memo line on the
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check 1346 and 1337 state, "Contribution to retirement plan.
Loan by retirement plan to Colleen Parkeit." Accordingly,
the contribution to the plan, by way of 4 loan to Colleen
Parker, was clearly made within one year of the petition
date and, therefore, not exempt under 78-423-5-1 (b) (ii) .
The debtor suggested that ther^ is an ordinary
course of business exception for contributions made within
one year of the petition date.

The debtor argues that In

re: Kuntz from our Utah Supreme Court in a 2004 case stands
for the proposition that normal ordinary payments are not
what are intended to be covered under th^ one-year exception
to retirement fund exemptions under 78-2^-5- (b) (2) . The
Court disagrees and finds that no such ordinary payment or
ordinary course of business exception is articulated in
Kuntz.
This Court had some say in referring that matter
over to the Supreme Court, Judge Clark ar^d I had two cases
regarding rollover retirement plans, and we struggled with
the issue of whether or not a rollover was a contribution
within one year, and we certified it to tihe Supreme Court.
And so there's a little bit of factual difference here.

I

disagree with the debtor's argument, and I find that there
is no exception, as articulate in Kuntz.

The decision in

Kuntz discusses the policy behind the on^-year in the
context of rollovers between exempt accounts.

That is not
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the case here; therefore, Kuntz is not applicable on this
point.
Based upon the evidence presented and the cases
relied upon herein, the court determines that the
combination plan is property of the estate.

Even though the

property is property of the estate, the Court determines the
Trustee has not met his burden in showing that the funds in
the combination plan are not exempt under 78-23-5-1 (a) (x) .
However, the Court determines that the Trustee has met his
burden of showing that the $10,000 payment by the PC to the
Keogh plan and the $10,400 Parker loan were contributions
made by or on behalf of the debtor within one year of the
petition date, accordingly.

These amounts totaling $20,400

are not exempt.
I'm going to ask Mr. Gillman to prepare an order
in judgment in connection with this matter referring to the
fact that the Court made its findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the record, and it was based upon
those that the Court orders that the -- whatever I said -that the amounts are exempt except for those two which come
back and should be turned over and paid to the Trustee
forthwith.
MR. GILLMAN:

I will be happy to prepare such an order,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Appreciate, again, the parties'

10thCir.Aptt.App
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participation.

The Court stands in recess

(Proceedings concluded at 3:13 p.m.)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

In re
DOUGLAS JAMES REINHART,

ORDfeR AFFIRMING
BANKRUPTCY COURT ORDERS

Debtor.
Case No. 2.08CV562 DAK
DAVID L. GLAD WELL, Trustee,
Appellant,
vs.
DOUGLAS JAMES REINHART,
Appellee.

This matter is before the court on the Trustee's appeal of two decisions by the Bankruptcy
Court

Oral argument on the appeal was heard on February 4, 2009

At the hearing, the

Trustee, David L Gladwell, was represented by Adam S Affleck, and the Debtor, Douglas
James Reinhart, was represented by Duane H Gillman Before the ipeanng, the court carefully
considered the bnefs and other matenals submitted by the parties Since taking the motions
under advisement, the court has further considered the law and facts) relating to this appeal Now
being fully advised, the court renders the following Order
The Bankruptcy Court's ruling that the funds contained in Debtor's Keogh Plan are
exempt under Utah Code Ann § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x) (2000) is affirmed for the same reasons
explained by the Bankruptcy Court in the oral ruling on May 15, 2008 See Transcript, Volume

10th Of Aplt App

DLG00373

Case 2:08-cv-00562-DAK

Document 19

Filed 02/06/2009

Page 2 of 2

///, dated May 15, 2008, attached as Exhibit 5 to Appellant's Opening brief Appendix.
Next, the Trustee contends that the Bankruptcy Court's Turnover Order should have
included post-contribution earnings on the $20,400 that was excepted from the exemption. It
appears that the Bankruptcy Court exercised its equitable powers to limit the turnover amount to
the principal amount contributed to the Keogh plan. The court finds no error in the Bankruptcy
Court's decision and therefore affirms the decision.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the two Bankruptcy Court Orders at issue
in this case are AFFIRMED, and this case is now closed.
DATED this 6th day of February, 2009.

BY THE COURT:

~L>J- 4. h Tt„/£,
DALE A. KIMBALL
United States District Judge

10th Cir. Aplt App
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

FILED
United States Court of Appeals

DEC ZZ 2009

In re

ELISABETH A, SriUMAKER

DOUGLAS JAMES REINHART,

Clerk

Debtor.
DAVID L. GLADWELL, Trustee

No. 09-4028
(D.t. No. 2:08-cv-562)
(D. Utah)

Appellant,
v.
DOUGLAS JAMES REINHART,
Appellee.

ORDER CERTIFYING STATE LAW QUESTION

Before TACHA, HOLLOWAY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM
This case turns on whether Mr. Douglas Reinhart's (Debtor) Keogh Plan should
have been exempted from his estate when he filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. To be
exempt, the Utah Code requires the plan be "described by" Section 401(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC). Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5 (2000).' The Bankruptcy Court found
the Keogh Plan was operationally in default on the Petition pate and would not be

'This statute is now Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-505(l)(a)(xw) (2008).
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"qualified" under § 401(a) but was nonetheless "described" by the section and therefore
exempt.
The Bankruptcy Court also excluded from the exemption the $20,400 Debtor had
paid into his Keogh during the year preceding filing for bankruptcy but the court did not
exclude the earnings stemming from that amount. The Trustee, Mr. David L. Gladweil,
appealed to the District Court arguing an unqualified plan cannot be described by section
40 i (a) and the court erred by failing to include the earnings of the contributed amount.
The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's holdings. This appeal followed.
Since the disposition of this appeal centers on an important and unsettled question
of the interpretation of Utah's bankruptcy statutes, we certify on our own motion,
pursuant to Tenth Circuit Rule 27.1 and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41, this issue
to the Utah Supreme Court:
I. Can a Keogh plan be "described by" section 401 (a) of the
IRC despite failing to fulfill that section's requirements for
qualification, thereby entitling debtor to exempt the plan from
his bankruptcy estate property?
Because the resolution of the second issue, of whether the appropriate amount was
excluded from the exemption, depends on the resolution of the first issue, we will stay its
consideration until the Utah Supreme Court has decided the first issue.
I. Background
On January 28, 2000, Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. In
his amended schedule he claimed a $333,835.65 exemption for his Keogh plan under

-2-
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x) (2000). This statute permits the funds in a Keogh
plan that is "described in" § 401(a) of the Internal Revenue pode to be exempt from the
claims of creditors and trustees in bankruptcy,
David Gladwell is the Trustee and he objected to the exemption on two bases: (1)
because of operational defaults, the Keogh plan was not qualified under § 401(a) and
therefore not described by the section and (2) even if the plan was qualified, the amount
contributed in the year prior to the Petition Date would not be exempt from the exemption
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii) (2000).2
From 1992 until the Petition Date, Debtor was an anesthesiologist He worked as a
sole practitioner until 1996 when he incorporated his practice. In 1992, Debtor
established his Keogh plan by adopting a prototype plan offered through Charles Schwab
& Co. Debtor was at all relevant times the sole employee uhder the plan and no one else
participated in or contributed to the plan.
One of the non-waivable requirements of the plan w^s that all eligible employees
be made participants. Although Debtor's wife was an eligible employee from 1993 until
the Petition Date, she was never included as a participant ui^der the plan. Debtor also
failed to have his incorporated practice adopt the Keogh pl^n so he remained as if he was
a self-employed individual despite the fact he was not. Although Debtor did make yearly
contributions to the plan, they were not the 10% of each participant's annual
compensation as the Keogh plan's documents required. Debtor also failed to have the
2

This statute is now Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-505(l)(b)(i|i) (2008).
-3-

Case: 09-4028

Document: 01018336098

Date Filed: 12/22/2009

Page: 4

contributions made through Schwab as the custodian of the Keogh and instead directly
made the investments himself. Debtor additionally made an automobile loan to Colleen
Parker through the Keogh plan. In 2000, Debtor caused contributions to be made that
were $1,455.75 in excess of the maximum contributions limits pursuant to § 415(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code.
At trial, Trustee's expert, W. Waldan Lloyd, testified each of these defects would
have disqualified the Keogh plan for tax purposes under § 401(a). Mr. Lloyd also
testified each of those defects was curable through certain IRS procedures. The
Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System (EPCRS) enables employers to selfcorrect operational errors in their Keogh plans in order to avoid sanctions and tax
consequences the IRS would otherwise be authorized to impose. All of the defects that
made the Keogh plan operationally in default were curable through EPCRS. The IRS had
neither previously qualified nor disqualified the plan.
The Bankruptcy Court decided the Keogh plan was "operationally in default" on
the Petition Date. Although the plan was "arguably not tax qualified" it was
"nonetheless, described in Section 401(a)" and therefore exempt from the estate. Aplt
App. at 51. The Bankruptcy Court relied heavily on In re Kaplan, 162 B.R. 684 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding the term "provided for under 401(a)" was broader than "qualified
under"and thus a non-qualified plan was still conditionally exempted), and decided a plan
could be described by § 401(a) without being qualified. Id. The court found $20,400 had
been contributed to the Keogh in the year prior to filing for bankruptcy and excluded that
-4-
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portion of the plan from the exemption. Id. at 28, 31. The cpurt did not include any
earnings from that amount. Id,
The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court, trustee appealed.
II. Discussion
Whether a "Described" Plan Must be a "Qualified" Plai^
Utah's legislature has opted out of the federal exemptions provided under the
bankruptcy code. Therefore, the only exemptions available are under Utah law. See 11
U.S.C. § 522(b); former Utah Code Ann, § 78-23-15 (2000}; current Utah Code Ann, §
78B-5-513 (2008). On the Petition Date, Utah Code Ann. j 78-23-5 read:
(l)(a) an individual is entitled to exemption of the
following property:...
(x) except as provided in Subseption (l)(b), any
money or other assets held for or payable to tie individual as
a participant or beneficiary from or an interest of the
individual as a participant or beneficiary in a retirement plan
or arrangement that is described in Section 4()l(a), 401(h),
401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 408A, 409, 414(d), or 414(e) of
the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1^86, as
amended....
(emjphasis added)
Section 401 is entitled "Qualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans5
and subsection (a) lists the "requirements for qualification.^
Trustee argues the plain language of Section 78-23 -j>(l)(b)(ii) requires a Keogh
plan be qualified under Section 401(a) by meeting all of its| requirements in order to be
described by the Section and thus be exempt from the banJkJruptcy estate. Because the
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plain language of a statute is the first source a court will examine when interpreting a
statute, the plain language should control. In re Kunz, 99 P.3d 793, 794 (Utah 2004).
Since the Keogh Plan in question was operationally in default on the Petition Date and
did not qualify under Section 401(a), it therefore would not be described by the section.
Additionally, Trustee asserts if a plan were permitted to not meet the section's
requirements and yet still be described by that section, such an interpretation would
render any reference to those requirements meaningless. Since courts are not supposed to
interpret a statute in a manner that would nullify any portion of its language, such an
interpretation would be incorrect See Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290,
1292 (Utah 1996).
Furthermore, Trustee argues the analysis of In re Kaplan, 162 B.R. 684, is
inapplicable because that case dealt with a different state's statute and even so the
Bankruptcy Court misapplied the case. Kaplan *s holding turned on the fact the plan in
question had previously been certified and its continued exemption depended on the IRS
refraining from de-certifying the plan. Id. at 697-98 ("If the IRS intervenes at a later date
and disqualifies the Plan, then and only then would it appear to us appropriate to preclude
die Debtor from continuing to assert that its proceeds are exempt from claims of the
Debtor's creditors.").
Debtor argues exemption statutes "are liberally construed in favor of the debtor"
and thus the Keogh plan in question should be exempt. Russell M. Miller Co. v. Givan,
325 P.2d 908, 909-10 (Utah 1958). The legislative history of the statute is minimal and
-6-
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fails to provide guidance as to the legislative intent. Additionally, since the plan could
have been remedied using the EPCRS program, any deficiencies were technical in nature
and should not prevent the court from applying the exemption. Akin to the statute of In
re Kaplan, this statute permits an unqualified plan to still bd described by the section, and
the court's policy of interpreting exemption statutes in favor of the debtor support the
bankruptcy and district court's interpretation of the exemption statute. 162 B.R. at 697
(describing the exemption statute's language as "very broad[ and that it appears to have
been drafted to include even plans which are not technically 'tax qualified' within its
scope").
In these circumstances, certification is appropriate. Tflie plain language of the
statute is ambiguous, the legislative history offers little guidance and the Utah courts have
not previously squarely dealt with this issue. If the Utah Co^ie was written to exempt
from bankruptcy Keogh plans that fail to meet the qualifications of section 401(a) but are
nonetheless described by the section then the bankruptcy an# district courts were correct.
If the Utah Code was written to integrate the Internal Revenue Code and have only those
plans that met the requirements laid out in section 401(a) be exempt from bankruptcy then
the courts were incorrect and should be reversed.
ILL Conclusion
The Utah courts do not appear to have answered the question before us. Since this
is a controlling question it is appropriate it be certified to th^ Utah Supreme Court. In the
interests of comity and federalism, the Utah Supreme Court should be permitted to
-7-
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answer this question in the first instance if it should choose to do so under Utah R. App.
P. 41.
The Clerk of this court shall transmit a copy of this certification order to counsel
for all parties. The Clerk will also forward, under the Tenth Circuit's official seal, a copy
of this certification order and the briefs filed in this court to the Utah Supreme Court.
We will appreciate the consideration of this request. This appeal is ordered
STAYED pending consideration of the certified question.
For the Court,

Deanell R. Tacha, Circuit Judge
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

In re: DOUGLAS JAMES REINHART,
Debtor.

DAVID L. GLAD WELL, Trustee,
Appellant,
No. 09-4028
v.
DOUGLAS JAMES REINHART,
Appellee.

ORDER

Before TACHA, HOLLO WAY and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

This matter is before the court on appellee's Petitio^i For Panel Rehearing. We
have construed the request as a motion to reconsider, as judgment has not entered in this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1). As construed, the motion seeks reconsideration of
the court's December 23, 2009 certification order to the Utjah Supreme Court. The
request is granted in part. An amended certification order $hall issue. The request is
granted to the extent of those amendments, but is otherwise denied. The Clerk is directed
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Document: 01018355351
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to forward the amended order to the Utah Supreme Court forthwith.

Entered for the Court,

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER
Clerk of Court
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
*. riled StaU
. . u of App^H
Tenth Circuit

In re

JAW

DOUGLAS JAMES REINHART,

25 mv

EL1SA

Debtor.
DAVID L. GLADWELL, Trustee

No. 09-4028
(DjC. No. 2:08-cv-562)
(D. Utah)

Appellant,
v.
DOUGLAS JAMES REINHART,
Appellee.

ORDER CERTIFYING STATE LAW QUESTION

Before TACHA, HOLLOWAY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM
This case turns on whether Mr. Douglas Reinhart's (Debtor) Keogh Plan should
have been exempted from his estate when he filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. To be
exempt, the Utah Code requires the plan be "described in" Section 401(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC). Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5 (2000).' The Bankruptcy Court found
the Keogh Plan was operationally in default on the Petition Date and would not be

'This statute is now Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-505(l)(a)(^iv) (2008).
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"qualified" under § 401(a) but was nonetheless "described" in the section and therefore
exempt.
The Bankruptcy Court also excluded from the exemption the $20,400 Debtor had
paid into his Keogh during the year preceding filing for bankruptcy but the court did not
exclude the earnings stemming from that amount. The Trustee, Mr. David L. Gladwell,
appealed to the District Court arguing an unqualified plan cannot be described in section
401 (a) and the court erred by failing to include the earnings of the contributed amount.
The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's holdings. This appeal followed.
Since the disposition of this appeal centers on an important and unsettled question
of the interpretation of Utah's bankruptcy statutes, we certify on our own motion,
pursuant to Tenth Circuit Rule 27.1 and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41, this issue
to the Utah Supreme Court:
1. Can a Keogh plan be "described in" section 401 (a) of the
IRC despite failing to fulfill that section's requirements for
qualification, thereby entitling debtor to exempt the plan from
his bankruptcy estate property?
Because the resolution of the second issue, of whether the appropriate amount was
excluded from the exemption, depends on the resolution of the first issue, we will stay its
consideration until the Utah Supreme Court has decided the first issue.
I. Background
On January 28, 2000, Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. In
his amended schedule he claimed a $333,835.65 exemption for his Keogh plan under

-2-
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x) (2000). This statute permits the funds in a Keogh
plan that is "described in" § 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code to be exempt from the
claims of creditors and trustees in bankruptcy.
David Gladwell is the Trustee and he objected to the exemption on two bases: (1)
because of operational defaults, the Keogh plan was not qualified under § 401(a) and
therefore not described in the section and (2) even if the plan was qualified, the amount
contributed in the year prior to the Petition Date would not] be exempt from the exemption
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii) (2000).2
From 1992 until the Petition Date, Debtor was an anesthesiologist. He worked as a
sole practitioner until 1996 when he incorporated his practjice. In 1992, Debtor
established his Keogh plan by adopting a prototype plan offered through Charles Schwab
& Co, Debtor was at all relevant times the sole employee under the plan and no one else
participated in or contributed to the plan.
One of the non-waivable requirements of the plan v^as that all eligible employees
be made participants. Although Debtor's wife was an eligible employee from 1993 until
the Petition Date, she was never included as a participant ijmder the plan. Debtor also
failed to have his incorporated practice adopt the Keogh pfan so he remained as if he was
a self-employed individual despite the fact he was not. Although Debtor did make yearly
contributions to the plan, they were not the 10% of each participant's annual
compensation as the Keogh plan's documents required. D|ebtor also failed to have the
2

This statute is now Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-505(l)(b)(ii) (2008).
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contributions made through Schwab as the custodian of the Keogh and instead directly
made the investments himself. Debtor additionally made an automobile loan to Colleen
Parker through the Keogh plan. In 2000, Debtor caused contributions to be made that
were $1,455.75 in excess of the maximum contributions limits pursuant to § 415(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code.
At trial, Trustee's expert, W. Waldan Lloyd, testified each of these defects would
have disqualified the Keogh plan for tax purposes under § 401(a). Mr. Lloyd also
testified each of those defects was curable through certain IRS procedures. The
Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System (EPCRS) enables employers to selfcorrect operational errors in their Keogh plans in order to avoid sanctions and tax
consequences the IRS would otherwise be authorized to impose. All of the defects that
made the Keogh plan operationally in default were curable through EPCRS. The IRS had
neither previously qualified nor disqualified the plan.
The Bankruptcy Court decided the Keogh plan was "operationally in default" on
the Petition Date. Although the plan was "arguably not tax qualified" it was
"nonetheless, described in Section 401(a)" and therefore exempt from the estate. Aplt
App. at 51. The Bankruptcy Court relied heavily on In re Kaplan, 162 B.R. 684 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding the term "provided for under 401(a)" was broader than "qualified
under"and thus a non-qualified plan was still conditionally exempted), and decided a plan
could be described in § 401 (a) without being qualified. Id. The court found $20,400 had
been contributed to the Keogh in the year prior to filing for bankruptcy and excluded that
-4-
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portion of the plan from the exemption. Id, at 28, 3 L The Court did not include any
earnings from that amount Id.
The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court. [Trustee appealed.
II. Discussion
Whether a "Described" Plan Must be a "Qualified" Ptyn
Utah's legislature has opted out of the federal exemptions provided under the
bankruptcy code. Therefore, the only exemptions available are under Utah law. See 11
U.S.C. § 522(b); former Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-15 (200(|); current Utah Code Ann. §
78B-5-513 (2008). On the Petition Date, Utah Code Ann. J} 78-23-5 read:
(l)(a) an individual is entitled to exemption of the
following property: ...
(x) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), any
money or other assets held for or payable to pie individual as
a participant or beneficiary from or an interest of the
individual as a participant or beneficiary in a retirement plan
or arrangement that is described in Section 4b 1(a), 401(h),
401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 408A, 409, 414M), or 414(e) of
the United States Internal Revenue Code of \ 986, as
amended....
(enjiphasis added)
Section 401 is entitled "Qualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans55
and subsection (a) lists the "requirements for qualification!'
Trustee argues the plain language of Section 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii) requires a Keogh
plan be qualified under Section 401(a) by meeting all of iW requirements in order to be
described in the Section and thus be exempt from the bankruptcy estate. Because the
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plain language of a statute is the first source a court will examine when interpreting a
statute, the plain language should control. In re Kunz, 99 P.3d 793, 794 (Utah 2004).
Since the Keogh Plan in question was operationally in default on the Petition Date and
did not qualify under Section 401(a), it therefore would not be described in the section.
Additionally, Trustee asserts if a plan were permitted to not meet the section's
requirements and yet still be described in that section, such an interpretation would render
any reference to those requirements meaningless. Since courts are not supposed to
interpret a statute in a manner that would nullify any portion of its language, such an
interpretation would be incorrect. See Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290,
1292 (Utah 1996).
Furthermore, Trustee argues the analysis of In re Kaplan, 162 B.R. 684, is
inapplicable because that case dealt with a different state's statute and even so the
Bankruptcy Court misapplied the case. Kaplan Js holding turned on the fact the plan in
question had previously been certified and its continued exemption depended on the IRS
refraining from de-certifying the plan. Id. at 697-98 ("If the IRS intervenes at a later date
and disqualifies the Plan, then and only then would it appear to us appropriate to preclude
the Debtor from continuing to assert that its proceeds are exempt from claims of the
Debtor's creditors.").
Debtor argues exemption statutes "are liberally construed in favor of the debtor"
and thus the Keogh plan in question should be exempt. Russell M Miller Co. v. Givan,
325 P.2d 908, 909-10 (Utah 1958). The legislative history of the statute is minimal and
-6-
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fails to provide guidance as to the legislative intent. Additionally, since the plan could
have been remedied using the EPCRS program, any deficiencies were technical in nature
and should not prevent the court from applying the exemption. Akin to the statute of In
re Kaplan, this statute permits an unqualified plan to still be described in the section, and
the court's policy of interpreting exemption statutes in favor of the debtor support the
bankruptcy and district court's interpretation of the exemption statute. 162 B.R. at 697
(describing the exemption statute's language as "very bro^d, and that it appears to have
been drafted to include even plans which are not technically 'tax qualified' within its
scope").
In these circumstances, certification is appropriate. The plain language of the
statute is ambiguous, the legislative history offers little guidance and the Utah courts have
not previously squarely dealt with this issue. If the Utah Cjode was written to exempt
from bankruptcy Keogh plans that fail to meet the qualifications of section 401(a) but are
nonetheless described in the section then the bankruptcy and district courts were correct.
If the Utah Code was written to integrate the Internal Revenue Code and have only those
plans that met the requirements laid out in section 401 (a)fyeexempt from bankruptcy then
the courts were incorrect and should be reversed.
III. Conclusion
The Utah courts do not appear to have answered the question before us. Since this
is a controlling question it is appropriate it be certified to fie Utah Supreme Court. In the
interests of comity and federalism, the Utah Supreme Couft should be permitted to
-7-
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answer this question in the first instance if it should choose to do so under Utah R. App.
P. 41.
The Clerk of this court shall transmit a copy of this certification order to counsel
for all parties. The Clerk will also forward, under the Tenth Circuit's official seal, a copy
of this certification order and the briefs filed in this court to the Utah Supreme Court.
We will appreciate the consideration of this request This appeal is ordered
STAYED pending consideration of the certified question.

For the Court,

Deanell R. Tacha, Circuit Judge
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